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Executive Compensation and Regulation Imposed Governance: Evidence from the 
California Non-Profit Integrity Act (2004) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In the wake of the much publicized governance failures in the corporate sector, the U.S. 
Congress had enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, SOX) in 2002 in an attempt to restore 
investor and public confidence in corporations. The scandals, however, were not just restricted to 
the corporate sector. Indeed, as Bolton and Mehran (2006) document, the not-for-profit sector 
had its own fair share of scandals too. Some examples include fraud and excessive compensation 
at NAACP, United Way, and Adelphi University;  private benefits paid to board members and 
friends of the Nature Conservancy; and allegations that the New Jersey Symphony Orchestra 
inflated instrument values to get a larger tax deduction.  
  The attorneys general of twenty separate states in the United States have reacted to these 
public sector scandals by launching 30 investigations into non-profit organizations across the 
country  (Eaton  and  Akers,  2007).  At  the  federal  level  the  United  States  Senate  Finance 
Committee  held  hearings  on  problems  in  the  not-for-profit  sector  under  the  title,  “Charity 
Oversight and Reform:  Keeping Bad Things From Happening to Good Charities” on  June 22
nd, 
2004. The regulatory attention – at both the state and federal levels in the not-for-profit sector 
was  focused  on  the  lack  of  good  governance  and  issues  relating  to  excessive  executive 
compensation.  The Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, Mark W. Everson, testified at 
the Senate hearings; 
“We need go no further than our daily newspapers to learn that some charities 
and  private  foundations  have  their  own  governance  problems…  We  are 
concerned that the governing boards of tax-exempt organizations are not, in all 
cases, exercising sufficient diligence as they set compensation for the leadership 
of the organizations. There have been numerous recent reports of executives of 2 
 
both private foundations and public charities who are receiving  unreasonably 
large compensation packages” 
1(emphasis added). 
 
In a regulatory response to the scandals plaguing non-profit organizations, the state of 
California  passed  the  Non-Profit  Integrity  Act  (SB1262)  in  2004.  This  Act,  which  became 
effective  January  1
st,  2005,  is  regarded  as  a  watershed  moment  in  regulatory  attempts  to 
strengthen governance mechanisms in the not-for-profit sector.  Closely modeled after SOX
2, the 
Act requires qualifying California charities to file audited financial statements with the Attorney 
General’s office and establish an audit committee.  The Act also requires boards of directors of 
non-profit organizations to approve the compensations of key executives and ensure that the 
compensation paid is “just and reasonable.”  Finally, the Act regulates the interaction between 
the charitable organization and commercial fundraisers.  Many other states have subsequently 
attempted to follow the examples set by governance legislation in the corporate sector as well as 
California’s Act (Mead 2008). 
The objective of this paper is to assess what impact California’s Non-profit Integrity Act 
(2004) (also referred to as “the Act” and “regulation” in the remainder of this paper) has had on 
the  executive  compensation  costs  of  affected  charitable  organizations.  Investigating  the 
executive  compensation  effects  of  the  Act  is  important  not  only  in  evaluating  whether  this 
legislation has achieved its intended objectives, but also in informing the broader policy debate 
on regulatory efforts to improve governance.  Such investigations would be especially useful for 
policy makers of other states contemplating similar regulations.   
                                                           
1Written Statement of Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate:  
Hearing  on  Charitable  Giving  Problems  and  Best  Practices.    IR-2004-81,  June  22,  2004.    Available  online  at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081.pdf 
2 For instance Jackson (2006) terms the act as “California “Sarbanes-Oxley clone” legislation”. 3 
 
The  Act  has  evoked  strong  responses  from  legal  experts  and  executives  of  affected 
organizations who feel that the requirements imposed by the Act are unwarranted. For example, 
Gilkeson (2007) argues against the necessity of the Act by pointing out that the benefits that 
would accrue to society as a result of this legislation would not justify the additional costs of 
compliance.  Mulligan  (2007)  contends  that  the  legislation  will  not  bring  about  the  desired 
improvements in governance in non-profit organizations because the Act takes a stockholder-
based normative approach, which is inappropriate in a non-profit setting. Executives of non-
profits in California have expressed concern that complying with the provisions of the Act will 
have serious financial consequences for these organizations. Conversely, proponents of the Act 
welcomed the new legislation as a step in the right direction towards creating transparency and 
restoring constituent confidence in the not-for-profit sector (Ljung 2005).   
The  effect  of  governance  regulations  on  executive  compensation  in  the  not-for-profit 
sector is an important research area for the following reasons.  First, due to the absence of an 
alienable residual claimant, agency conflicts in the not-for-profit sector are not identical to those 
of the for-profit sector, making a mechanical extension of the research findings for the for profit 
sector to the not-for-profit sector questionable.  Many donors to charities donate without any 
expectation of return. They contribute to charities because they feel good doing so (Andreoni, 
1990).  Thus, strengthened governance mechanisms may not necessarily be relevant to them, in 
contrast to shareholders of corporations.  On the other hand, proponents of regulation would 
argue that non-profits need more regulatory attention precisely for this reason.  Therefore it is 
necessary to engage in studies that are focused on the not-for-profit sector only.  
Additionally, the not-for-profit sector accounts for a large and rapidly growing segment 
of the US economy, meriting research attention on account of its sheer size.  According to Wing 4 
 
et al (2010) there were nearly 600,000 non-profits that collected more than $25,000 in gross 
receipts and filed an informational return with the IRS in 2008 – a growth of 47 percent since 
1998.  Moreover, in that same year, they generated over $1.9 trillion in revenue – about 13 
percent of the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
Although there have been many arguments in the popular press and among practitioners 
on  the  relative  merits  or  lack  thereof  in  regulating  non-profits,  there  is  a  clear  paucity  of 
scholarly research on this issue.  With respect to California’s Non-profit Integrity Act, Neely 
(2011)
3 presents some initial evidence by examining some potential benefits (or lack of) brought 
about by the Act.  Comparing the data in the year immediately before and after the passage of the 
Act, Neely (2011) concludes that the Act did not result in a discern able change in reporting 
practices or commercial fund raising activities of the affected organizations.  While Neely’s 
(2011) study is focused on uncovering whether the Act has resulted in desirable improvements in 
matters  pertaining  to  disclosure  quality,  and  commercial  fund  raising  activities,  this  paper 
investigates whether the Act has generated desired benefits in terms of reigning in executive 
compensation packages that were allegedly “unreasonably large.”   
In assessing the efficacy of regulator enforced governance mechanisms in not-for-profits, 
the  issue  of  executive  compensation  is  important  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  excessive 
executive compensation in not-for-profits has long been a source of concern for many parties and 
the Act has specific provisions aimed at addressing this issue.  Second, the effectiveness of any 
regulation can only be correctly assessed when both potential benefits and costs are evaluated.  
Governance regulations may indirectly affect executive compensation through imposing certain 
risks and restrictions on executives.  Specifically, executives could demand higher compensation 
in response to the perceived higher risk imposed by the Act.  Indeed, there is evidence that the 
                                                           
3 To our knowledge, Neely’s is the only other study that examines the impact of the Act on aspects of performance of non-profits. 5 
 
passage of SOX has led to increases in director compensation (Linck et al, 2009), and changes in 
the executive compensation mix (Cohen et al, 2008b).  Hence, an investigation of executive 
compensation effects is an important component of any comprehensive cost-benefit assessment 
of regulation.
4   
Using a sample of 1,850 California  non-profit firms  which are impacted by the Act  
during a six year period surrounding the adoption of the Act, we analyze the pre to post -
regulation changes in executive compensation in comparison to a control group of similar  non-
profits that are domiciled in the state of Ohio
5 and hence were not subjected to the provisions of 
the Act. 
This difference-in-differences approach enables us to minimize the concern that observed 
changes could be due to other omitted factors that are unrelated to the Act.  We use two 
measures of executive compensation: ratio of officer compensation to total revenue (Execomp1) 
and ratio of officer compensation to total salaries (Execomp2).  Our results indicate that affected 
California non-profits experienced a greater increase in executive compensation from pre to post-
regulation in comparison to the Ohio non-profits.  The increase is significant both statistically 
and  economically.    For  example,  after  adjusting  for  the  contemporaneous  change  in  control 
group, executive compensation of affected California non-profits has gone up by approximately 
10  percent  from  pre  to  post  Act  periods.    This  finding  should  be  of  particular  concern  to 
regulators as the outcome of the Act in relation to executive compensation seems to be in stark 
contrast to its objectives.   
                                                           
4 In other words Neely’s (2011) lack of evidence on the Act having significant changes in the behavior of not-for-profits may 
need not be viewed negatively on its own.  If the Act did not impose significant costs either, the overall impact of the Act could 
be neutral.    We also note however, that extant research on the impact of the Act is not exhaustive and there may be significant 
effects on aspects other than those that are investigated by Neely (2011) and us. 
5 Our choice of Ohio as a control group is motivated by the similarity in the regulatory environment for non-profits to California. 
We explain our choice of Ohio in detail later in the paper. 6 
 
While  the  difference-in-differences  approach  is  useful  in  negating  omitted  correlated 
variables  problems  we  cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  that  observed  results  are  due  to  more 
dominant state (i.e. California) specific factors, other than the enactment of the Act.  We address 
this potential concern by also employing California not-for-profit firms from exempt industries 
as an additional control group.  Our results are robust to this alternative choice of control group.  
Even with the California control group, our conclusions about executive compensation costs 
increasing after the enactment of the Act remain unchanged. 
Next, we investigate whether any changes in executive compensation highlighted above 
are  more  pronounced  for  organizations  that  are  less  likely  to  have  voluntarily  pre-adopted 
governance  measures  similar  to  those  prescribed  by  the  Act.  In  addition  to  highlighting  the 
differential  cost  implications  of  regulations  for  different  organizations,  detection  of  such 
differences lend further confidence that our earlier findings are, in fact, caused by the Act. As 
prior research documents that larger not-for-profits are more likely to voluntarily adopt more 
stringent,  SOX-like  governance  mechanisms  (Ostrower  and  Bobowick  2006;  Vermeer  et  al. 
2006), we also investigate whether the observed executive compensation effect of the Act differs 
across smaller and larger not-for-profits.  In line with prior research, we expect the executive 
compensation  effect  to  be  more  pronounced  for  smaller  of  the  affected  not-for-profits.  Our 
results confirm this expectation.  The earlier recorded increase in compensation is entirely driven 
by the smaller than median (in terms of total assets) firms of our sample, indicating that the Act 
did not create an incremental impact on those firms that were more likely to have voluntarily pre-
adopted its recommendations.   
While  it  is  a  matter  of  concern  that  compensation  costs  of  the  affected  charities  in 
California appear to have increased after the Act, it is possible that the observed increase in 7 
 
executive  compensation  was  offset  by  savings  in  non-program  related  costs  and/or  was 
associated  with  a  subsequent  improvement  in  program-related  efforts,  as  captured  by  the 
program ratio.
6  If so, increases in compensation would be largely justified.  We investigate this 
possibility by analyzing the changes in total non-program related expenses and program ratio, to 
determine the effectiveness of the organization .   Our results suggest that the ratio of non -
program expenses to total revenue appears to have increased after 2004 , meaning that the 
organization did not become more effective.  We also do not find any comparative improvements 
in program ratio. Collectively, these results indicate that the increases in executive compensation 
were not associated with savings in other costs or more effort in charitable activities.  
Another alternative explanation of our finding of increases in executive compensation is 
that  in  pre -Act  periods,  organizations  were  able  to  opportunistically  classify  a  portion  of 
executive compensation as program expenses and the greater reporting discipline forced by the 
Act has prevented this from happening in post -Act periods.   If the Act  has  prevented such 
opportunistic classification shifting, one could observe an increase in reported compensation 
expenses, but total expenses should remain unchanged.   However, we find that pre to post-Act, 
changes in the excess of revenue over expenses (scaled by total revenue) is more negative for 
affected California organizations in comparison to control group, making this “elimination of 
classification shifting” argument less plausible.   
Overall,  our  results  indicate  that  not  only  did  the  Act’s  provisions  aimed  at  limiting 
“excessive”  executive  compensation  not  meet  the  desired  objectives,  but  also  the  greater 
regulatory  scrutiny  and  reporting  burden  introduced  by  the  Act  has,  in  fact,  led  to  further 
                                                           
6 Charities that meet the established cutoffs for program expense as a percentage of total expense and fund raising costs as a 
percentage of contributions are more likely to receive favorable reviews by watchdog groups. NFP executives may have 
additional incentives to manage ratios. Baber, et al. (2002) show that increases in amounts committed to program activities that 
result from improving the program spending ratio correlate with changes in executive compensation. 8 
 
increases in executive compensation.  Our findings thus raise questions as to whether regulation 
enforced changes in governance can bring about desired results.  Mead (2008) reports that at 
least four other states (CT, NH, WV, MA) have already passed SOX inspired not-for-profit 
reforms and at least six others (MI, MS, NY, OH, PA, VT) were considering doing so.  In this 
respect,  our  study  has  important  policy  implications  for  states  that  have  enacted  similar 
legislation or are contemplating doing so.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief institutional 
background of the Act; Section 3 develops the hypotheses; Section 4 describes the empirical 
methodology;  Section  5  describes  the  data  and  presents  the  empirical  results  and  Section  6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Institutional Background 
In the wake of the numerous scandals and governance failures
7 in the not-for-profit sector 
and the euphoria surrounding the enactment of SOX, the state of California enacted the Non -
Profit Integrity Act in 2004.  The Act, which aims to strengthen governance measures involving 
non-profit organizations, was signed into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on September 29, 
2004, and became effective on January 1, 2005.  The Act broadly covers two areas: governance 
and commercial fundraising activities of non-profit organizations.  The main provisions include: 
1.  Requirement to  prepare publicly accessible annual  financial statements  audited by an 
independent public accountant (CPA).  
2.  Establishment of an audit committee that is responsible for making recommendations on 
hiring  and  firing  of  auditors,  negotiating  auditor  compensation,  approving  non-audit 
                                                           
7  For example a 1999 series of Chicago Tribune articles reported that a major child sponsorship organization had continued to 
accept contributions for children who were dead.  Examples of other fraudulent activities include Ponzi schemes (Harris 2002) as 
well as personal use of charitable assets (Whoriskey and Salmon 2003; Herbert 2006) 9 
 
services by the auditor, and ensuring that financial affairs of the non-profit organization 
are in order.  
3.  Requirement to review the executive compensation of charitable organizations by their 
governing boards or authorized board committees to ensure that payment is “just and 
reasonable”.  
4.  Numerous provisions aimed at regulating commercial fundraising activities by not-for-
profit organizations.  
The Act applies to all charitable organizations, unincorporated associations, and trusts 
over  which  the  State  of  California  or  the  Attorney  General  has  enforcement  or  supervisory 
powers.  However, provisions 1 and 2 above apply only to those with gross revenues exceeding 
two  million  dollars.  The  two  million  dollar  threshold  excludes  grants  received  from 
governmental entities, if the non-profit must provide an accounting of how it used the grant 
funds.  Moreover, educational institutions, religious organizations, hospitals, licensed health care 
service plans, and cemeteries are exempt from the provisions of the Act. 
The focus of this paper is on the executive compensation implications of the Act.  The 
requirement  3  above  is  directly  aimed  at  addressing  concerns  regarding  “excessively  high” 
executive compensations in the not-for-profit sector and ensuring that compensation is “just and 
reasonable”.  Additionally, we think that even the other requirements have potential executive 
compensation  implications  as  stringent  monitoring  and  reporting  requirements  alter  an 
executive’s risk exposures, creates additional administrative burden, and potentially limit his/her 
expropriation opportunities.    
In the next section, we develop the hypotheses and expand on these issues. 
   10 
 
 
3.  Hypothesis Development  
Following the highly publicized corporate scandals of the last decade and the subsequent 
enactment of SOX, there have been numerous empirical studies on the impact of governance 
regulation in the for-profit sector.  Several of these document the benefits of SOX, suggesting 
that the governance in the corporate sector has improved following the enactment. For instance, 
Lobo and Zhou (2006) document an increase in accounting conservatism following SOX. Both 
Bartov and Cohen (2008) and Cohen et al (2008a) find the passage of SOX to have resulted in a 
reduction of earnings management through accruals.  Cohen et al (2011) report that auditors 
consider  SOX  to  have  resulted  in  a  substantial  improvement  in  corporate  governance 
environment.    
While  the  above  studies  have  documented  some  benefits  of  SOX,  others  argue  that 
efficient  governance  practices  emerge  endogenously  through  value  maximizing  contracts 
between firm’s stakeholders.  According to this point of view, exogenously imposed governance 
mechanisms could be value destroying as they force the alteration of endogenously emerged 
efficient equilibriums.  For example, Romano (2005) argues that SOX provisions that regulate 
certain aspects of executive compensation are inherently problematic as investors would have to 
increase  another  component  of  a  manager’s  pay  package  to  make  up  the  loss  in  utility.  
Moreover, this is likely to be costlier as the now-restricted compensation option would not have 
been present if it was not relatively more efficient.  In a related study, Cohen et al (2008b) report 
that  the  additional  liability  imposed  by  SOX  on  corporate  executives  has  altered  the 
compensation mix away from incentive compensation and towards fixed salary.  Further, they 
find that SOX has reduced the level of risk taking by corporate executives on behalf of their 11 
 
firms.  In a recent paper, Larcker et al (2011) find that market reaction to recent events relating to 
corporate  governance  regulations  are  largely  negative,  implying  that  costs  of  regulation  are 
seemingly greater than benefits when it comes to exogenously imposed corporate governance.   
 
3.1 Governance and Executive Compensation in the Not-for-Profit Sector 
     The not-for-profit sector is, however, distinctively different from the corporate sector in 
the absence of residual claimants.  The absence of intense monitoring by a residual-claimant as 
in the corporate sector, and the virtual immunity from ouster via takeovers may present non-
profit-managers with a greater latitude to expropriate the firm’s assets and engage in other forms 
of opportunistic behavior, thereby providing a rationale for greater regulatory oversight.    
On  the  other  hand  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983a,  1983b)  argue  that  absence  of  alienable 
residual  claims  in  the  not-for-profit  sector  is  a  natural  response  to  avoid  the  donor-residual 
claimant agency problems that could arise in such entities.  In other words, when a part of an 
organization’s net cash flow is from resources provided by donors, the presence of parties with a 
residual claim on net cash flows makes it difficult to assure donors that they are protected from 
expropriation  by  residual  claimants.    Fama  and  Jensen  (1983a)  note  that  in  response  to  the 
unique nature of their agency conflicts, non-profits have adopted board structures with some 
noticeable differences  from  those of for-profit corporations.   These include self-perpetuating 
boards, presence of major donors as board members, and general absence of internal agents as 
voting members of the board.  If this latter view is true, regulatory imposition of governance 
rules on not-for-profits can be viewed as an unnecessary and costly intervention.   
Accordingly, governance in the not-for-profit sector in general and attempts to regulate 
the same in particular are contentious areas that provide rich research opportunities.  While a 12 
 
number of studies explore issues related to governance in the not-for-profit sector and not-for-
profit boards (for example, Bradshaw et al. 1992; Callen and Falk 1993; Olson 2000; Callen et al 
2003; Vermeer et al. 2006) there is a clear dearth of research that explores how not-for-profits 
are  affected  by  governance  regulations.    California’s  Non-profit  Integrity  Act  presents  the 
researcher with unique opportunities in this regard.  Neely (2011) reports preliminary evidence 
that this Act did not have a significant impact in improving reporting practices and commercial 
fund raising activities of affected organizations.  
   However,  despite  the  fact  that  the  Act  has  incorporated  specific  provisions  aimed  at 
curbing excessive executive compensation, to our knowledge, no research has investigated the 
impact of the Act (or any other not-for-profit regulation for that matter) on this aspect till date.  
The importance of executive compensation related issues in the not-for-profit sector is evidenced 
through  continuous  concerns  raised  by  regulators  in  recent  times  over  possible  executive 
compensation abuses.  For example, issues relating to abuses in executive compensation have 
come up several times during the Senate hearings on June 22nd, 2004 and the staff discussion 
paper that was released subsequent to these hearings (commonly known as the “Grassley White 
Paper”) presents a number of proposals aimed  at curbing such abuses (United States Senate 
Finance  Committee  2004).
8  Therefore,  whether  and  how  the  Act  has  altered  executive 
compensation in affected California not-for-profits is an interesting research question that can 
potentially influence the policy debate. 
We think that the executive compensation implications of the Act  are many-fold.  In a 
normative  sense,  if  the  executive  compensation  in  non-profits  is  indeed  excessive  and 
compensation  review  requirements  of  the Act  are  effective,  we  should  observe  a  relative 
                                                           
8 These proposals include annual, in advance approval of executive compensation by the board, public disclosure of 
compensation arrangements with justifications, and ensuring that compensation consultants are independent and hired by and 
report to the board. 13 
 
decrease in executive compensation, following the enactment of the Act.  On the other hand, a 
positive approach to the issue dictates the opposite to be true for at least two non-mutually 
exclusive reasons.  First, if the endogenously emerged compensation schemes are efficient in 
terms of attracting and retaining managerial talent and minimizing agency conflicts, unwarranted 
regulatory scrutiny can potentially increase compensation costs as agents alter the composition of 
compensation packages to exclude elements that are viewed negatively by regulators and replace 
these with more costly alternatives (Romano 2005).  Second, if stricter regulations and closer 
monitoring impose  greater risks  on the manager, this  could  lead to  the manager demanding 
greater compensation in return.  Thus, it is possible that compensation costs increase after the 
passage of the Act.  Our (refutable) hypothesis is formally stated below.
9 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): 
Executive  compensation  costs  of  affected  California  not-for-profits  have 
decreased more from pre to post-Act periods in comparison to the control group.   
 
3.2 Differential impact of the Act based on likelihood of voluntary adoption of governance 
measures 
Next, we investigate whether any changes in executive compensation induced by the Act 
are  more  pronounced  for  organizations  that  are  less  likely  to  have  voluntarily  pre-adopted 
governance measures similar to those prescribed by the Act.  This analysis invokes our interest in 
two aspects.  First, it potentially sheds light on whether and how regulations of this nature can 
have differential impacts on different organizations; an issue that should be of interest to policy 
makers.  Second, in the event that we do find the changes in executive compensation from pre to 
post-Act period to be more pronounced for firms that are less likely to have voluntarily pre-
adopted  similar  governance  measures,  it  acts  as  corroborative  evidence  that  lends  further 
                                                           
9 All hypotheses have been stated in the alternate form. 14 
 
confidence to our assertion that findings of Hypothesis 1 are in fact driven by the Act.  Prior 
research indicates that larger not-for-profit organizations are more likely to voluntarily adopt 
stronger  governance  mechanisms.    For  example,  in  analyzing  the  Urban  Institute’s  National 
Survey of Nonprofit Governance, Ostrower and Bobowick (2006) report that larger organizations 
are  more  likely  to  have  independent  audit  committees,  more  likely  to  make  their  financial 
statements available to the public, have a formal conflict of interest policy for board members, 
and have a process to protect whistleblowers.  Moreover, Vermeer et al (2006) find that larger 
not-for-profit organizations are more likely to have audit committees with solely independent 
directors.   
If larger organizations are more likely to have stricter governance mechanisms to start 
with, we would expect the impact of regulation on these organizations to be relatively lower.  If 
this is true, any evidence observed in support of Hypothesis 1 should be stronger for smaller not-
for-profit entities.  Therefore we propose the following as our second hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2):  
The change in executive compensation due to Non-profit Integrity Act is greater 
for smaller affected organizations.  
 
We  note  however,  that  the  Act  is  fully  applicable  to  significantly  large  not-for-profit 
organizations (with annual gross revenues in excess of two million dollars).  It is possible that 
size effects on the voluntary adoption of governance mechanisms are not that pronounced for this 
sub sample of organizations that are significantly large to begin with.  While this would bias 
against us finding results in support of Hypothesis 2, we still consider this to be an important 
question as the rationale for the Act and its potential impact becomes questionable if a large 15 
 
majority of the organizations that fall under its  purview have already voluntarily adopted its 
recommendations. 
We discuss our data and empirical methodology in the next section. 
 
4.  Empirical Methodology and Data 
4.1 Empirical Methodology 
We employ two measures of executive compensation: 
I.  Execomp1: Ratio of officer compensation to total revenue 
II.  Execomp2: Ratio of officer compensation to total salaries  
Execomp1 captures the proportion of annual financial inflows that is been paid out to 
officers  as  compensation.    Execomp2  measures  the  executive’s  share  of  total  compensation 
expense.  Scaling by total revenue in Execomp1 adjusts for changes in executive compensation 
due to changes in overall scale of operations.  However, this measure does not capture potential 
effects of wage inflation being different to that of overall inflation in the economy.  Execomp2 
adjusts for this possibility since the denominator too is a wage measure.   
We analyze the pre to post-Act changes in executive compensation of affected California 
not-for-profits and compare these with changes in our control group (difference-in-differences 
estimations).  The ideal control group for this purpose should be a group of non-profits that are 
similar to those in California and operate under similar pre-Act regulatory environment, but did 
not experience the effect of regulation (the Act) under consideration.  We use non-profits of 
similar industries and size thresholds based in the state of Ohio as our control group.  Our choice 
of Ohio not-for-profits as the control group is motivated by Fremont-Smith (2004) and Desai and 
Yetman  (2005)  who  present  comprehensive  reviews  of  state  regulations  affecting  non-profit 16 
 
organizations.  Desai  and Yetman (2005) classify  the 17 pieces  of legislation  documented in 
Fremont-Smith (2004) into a detection index (11 laws) and a prosecution index (6 laws). Ohio 
and California are similar in these aspects, differing only among 2 dimensions. Both states have 
the same filling requirements in the pre-Act period, with the exception that Ohio non-profits do 
not have to report to the Attorney General’s office if they sell substantially all of their assets.  
California and Ohio are similar along the prosecution index also, with the exception that in Ohio 
there is no unique set of statutory laws that apply only to non-profit organizations.   
Similar to  prior studies that have focused on the implementation  effects  of reporting 
standards (Roberts 2005) and regulations (Neely 2011) in the not-for-profit sector we conduct 
our analysis by comparing the relevant descriptive statistics in univariate settings.  Additionally, 
we also run multivariate tests with industry fixed effects to ensure that univariate results are not 
driven  by  differences  and  changes  in  industry  composition.    The  general  model  of  the 
multivariate tests is as follows: 
                                                                              
where, for firm i, and year t: 
y = the dependent variable of interest 
Post = an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for years after the Act (2005-2007) and 
zero otherwise (2002-2004) 
Calif  =  an  indicator  variable  taking  the  value  of  1  if  the  organization  is  based  in 
California and affected by the Act, and zero otherwise 
Industry = dummy variables for industry controls.  The National Taxonomy of Exempt 
Entities – Core Codes (NTEE-CC) divides the not-for-profit universe into 26 separate 
industries.  The  sample  that  we  use  for  testing  Hypotheses  1  and  2  covers  all  these 17 
 
industries, except those that come under the scope of education, grant making, health 
care,  religion and organizations classified as unknown. 
Our  dependent  variables  are  the  ratio  of  officer  compensation  to  total  revenue 
(Execomp1) and the ratio of officer compensation to total salaries (Execomp2).  The interaction 
coefficient (   ̂) captures the pre to post-Act change in variable of interest over and above that of 
control group and is our coefficient of interest.  In testing Hypothesis 2, where the impact of the 
Act for large and small organizations is separated, we run equation (1) in a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) (Zellner 1962) setting with dependent variables (Execomp1 and Execomp2) 
separated by whether the total assets of the organization are above (Large Firm) or below (Small 
Firm) the sample median. We employ a SUR approach because it is more general than the 
simple OLS model and allows the error terms to be cross-correlated, a distinct possibility for our 
sample of small and large non-profits. 
4.2 Data 
We obtain the bulk of the financial data required for the empirical analysis from the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) core data files. The core data file, however, 
does not provide detailed breakdowns of many line items necessary for our analysis. In order to 
obtain  those,  we  also  use  the  NCCS  digitized  database,  which  runs  from  1998-2003  and 
manually collect individual Form 990s for years after 2003. Our sample covers the period from 
2002 to 2007. Table 1 highlights our sample selection criteria. We start with an initial sample of 
201,661 firm-year observations (57,352 firms) from California and Ohio in the intersection of 
the  core  data,  digitized  database  and  the  Form  990s.  Next,  we  delete  observations  from 
organizations  with  gross  annual  receipts  of  less  than  two  million  dollars  as  some  important 
provisions  of  the  Act  do  not  apply  to  them.    This  results  in  a  loss  of  175,625  firm-year 18 
 
observations  (50,347  firms).    We  also  delete  those  observations  from  industries  that  are 
exempted  from  the  requirements  of  the  Act  such  as  educational  institutions,  hospitals,  and 
religious  organizations.  This  leads  to  a  further  loss  of  11,422  firm-year  observations  (2,909 
firms). Finally, we delete the observations with missing values for key variables and truncate the 
sample at 1 percent and 99 percent to mitigate the effects of outliers.  Our final sample consists 
of 8,514 firm-year observations (1,554 firms).The Treatment group of California firms consist of 
6,329 firm-year observations (1,155 firms) while the control  group of Ohio firms consist of 
2,185 firm-year observations (399 firms).  The higher number of observations from California is 
not surprising, given that it is a more populous state.
10 
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2 presents the industry distribution of our sample. As the Table shows, our  sample 
covers  a  wide  range  of  industries  that  are  covered  by  the  Act.    There  is  a  significant 
concentration of organizations in Human Services – Multipurpose and Other accounting for 42.0 
percent, 41.7 percent, and 43.0 percent of full, California, and Ohio samples respectively. Arts, 
Culture, and Humanities also account for over 10 percent of observations across the groups.  
More  importantly,  we  do  not  find  substantial  differences  in  industry  distribution  between 
California and Ohio samples.   
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. As the Act is fully enforced only on 
non-profits with over two million dollars in annual gross revenue (excluding grants), our sample 
consists of relatively large organizations.  Mean (median) values of total assets and total annual 
revenue  are  23.1  (6.1)  and  12.8  (6.1)  million  dollars.    Untabulated  analysis  indicate  that 
                                                           
10 According to 2010 census of US Census Bureau total population of California and Ohio were 37,253,956 and 
11,536,504 respectively.  (http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-pop-text.php)  19 
 
California and Ohio samples do not differ significantly in terms of assets even though California 
non-profits are larger in terms of revenue, total expenses, and non-program expenses.  Mean 
(median) officer salaries for total, California, and Ohio samples are 0.80 (0.52), 0.79 (0.52), and 
0.86 (0.49) million dollars respectively.  The mean officer salaries are not significantly different 
between California and Ohio.  In terms of variables used in empirical analysis, both California 
and Ohio non-profits expend around 3 percent of revenue on officer compensation (Execomp1) 
on average.  Also, on average, officer compensation amounts to about 12 percent of total salary 
bill  (Execomp2)  for  both  groups.    The  Non-program  expense  ratio  is  slightly  lower  for 
California, which appears to be getting translated to a slightly better Program ratio.  Descriptive 
statistics indicate that California and Ohio groups are generally comparable in terms of financial 
indicators.   
Insert Table 3 here 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1 Changes in Executive Compensation 
Panel  A  of  Table  4  reports  univariate  tests  of  Hypothesis  1,  which  investigates  the 
changes in executive compensation costs of firms that are affected by the Act.  In terms of 
Execomp1  (that  is,  executive  compensation  scaled  by  total  revenue),  we  find  that  executive 
compensation costs have gone up from pre to post Act period for both California and Ohio 
organizations.    More  interestingly,  difference-in-differences  tests  reveal  that  the  increase  in 
Execomp1  is  significantly  larger  for  affected  California  firms  (z-statistic  =  5.439,  p-value  < 
0.01).  This increase is economically significant as well.  After controlling for contemporaneous 
change in control group, the proportion of revenue paid as executive compensation for California 
not-for-profits have gone up by 10 per cent (0.003/0.030), on average in the post-Act period.  20 
 
Untabulated results indicate that this relative increase in executive compensation cost is not due 
to changes (i.e. decreases) in revenue which is used as the denominator in Execomp1.  In fact, 
untabulated  analysis  indicates  that  revenues  have  increased  from  pre  to  post-Act  for  both 
California and Ohio not-for-profits and the increase in California is greater than that of Ohio.   
Inferences in terms of Execomp2 (executive compensation scaled by total compensation) 
are very similar.  While both California and Ohio witnessed increases in Execomp2 from pre to 
post-Act periods, the increase in California is significantly greater than that of Ohio firms (z-
statistic = 5.523, p-value<0.01).  The executive compensation share of total compensation has 
increased by over 13 percent (0.014/0.105), on average from pre to post-Act periods for affected 
California not-for-profits after controlling for contemporaneous increase in Ohio control group. 
Insert Table 4 here 
Panel B of Table 4 reports multivariate results for Hypothesis 1.  These are consistent 
with the inferences of univariate tests.  The interaction coefficient Post*Calif (   ̂) is positive and 
significant  in  both  Execomp1  (coefficient  estimate=0.423;  t-statistic=1.640)  and  Execomp2 
(coefficient estimate=1.382, t-statistic=1.690) models (p-value < 0.1 for both).   Collectively, 
these results are consistent with the notion that increased risk and administrative burden brought 
about by the Act has resulted in higher executive compensation costs, contrary to regulator’s 
objective  of  reducing  the  same.    These  results  are  not  consistent  with  Hypothesis  1,  which 
predicts that executive compensation has decreased in affected non-profits in California as a 
result of the Act. 
In order to further substantiate that our empirical results above are indeed due to the Act, 
we use a second control group of non-profits drawn from organizations in California that are 
classified as religious, grant making, health and education that have gross receipts in excess of 21 
 
USD 2mn. The advantage of using this control group is that these organizations are all drawn 
from California but are exempt from the requirements of the Act. Using this additional control 
sample conclusively eliminates any possibility that our results in Table 4 may have been driven 
by more dominant California-specific factors that are not related to the Act.
11 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for this control sample.  The Table reveals that the 
non-profits in the California control sample are much larger than those that constitute the test 
sample in terms of total assets – the mean (median) total assets for the control sample is 37.866 
(8.503) million dollars; total revenue – the mean (median) total revenue for the control sample is 
24.900 (7.699) million dollars; and total expenses – the mean (median) total expenses for the 
control  sample  is  19.307  (6.279)  million  dollars.  Untabulated  results  suggest  that  these 
differences are all statistically significant, suggesting that the control sample consists of larger 
non-profits. The main variables of interest, Execomp1, Execomp2, Non-program expense ratio, 
Program ratio and Excess are, however, very comparable to the test group. Specifically, the 
mean (median) values for Execomp1, Execomp2, Non-program expense ratio, Program ratio and 
Excess  are  0.030  (0.019),  0.094  (0.048),  0.114  (0.155),  0.822  (0.802),  and  0.044  (0.030) 
respectively. There is no statistical difference in these variables between the test and control 
groups. 
Insert Table 5 here 
In Table 6, we present the results for Hypothesis 1 using the California control sample. 
Panel A presents the univariate results. The Table shows that the difference-in-differences for 
both Execomp1 (z-statistic = 7.418, p-value < 0.01) and Execomp2 (z-statistic = 10.616, p-value 
                                                           
11 Our Ohio control group is similar to treatment group in terms of industry composition, but differs in the State of domicile.  In 
contrast, this second control group is domiciled in the same State, but consists of different industries. 22 
 
< 0.01) are significantly positive, suggesting that executive compensation has appeared to have 
increased significantly in the affected California non-profits after the Act.  
Insert Table 6 here 
Panel  B  of  Table  6  presents  the  results  of  the  multivariate  analysis.  Notice  that  the 
interaction coefficient (    ̂), which captures the effect of the Act on the executive compensation 
in  affected  California  non-profits  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  for  both  Execomp1 
(coefficient=0.003,  t-statistic=1.900)  and  Execomp2  (coefficient=0.018,  t-statistic=2.960) 
models.  Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  executive  compensation  appears  to  have 
increased in affected California non-profits after the Act. This result is consistent with the results 
presented in Table 4, using the Ohio control group.  
Our results indicate that contrary to regulator expectations, the Act has in fact resulted in 
an increase in executive compensation expenses for affected non-profits.   
5.2 Differential Impact on Likelihood of Voluntary Adoption 
In Hypothesis 2 we test whether the increase in executive compensation detected above is 
more pronounced for smaller non-profits as they are relatively less likely to have voluntarily pre-
adopted  the  governance  measures  introduced  by  the  Act  (Ostrower  and  Bobowick  2006; 
Vermeer et al 2006).  Table 7 presents the SUR results with dependent variables (Execomp1 and 
Execomp2) separated by whether the total assets of the organization are above (Large Firms) or 
below (Small Firms) the sample median.  Consistent with our prediction, we find that interaction 
coefficient (   ̂), which captures the effect of the Act on the executive compensation in affected 
California non-profits, is positive and statistically significant for Small Firms, but not for Large 
Firms.  The results are consistent for both Execomp1 (for Small Firms; coefficient=0.007, t-
statistic=2.430, for Large Firms; coefficient=-0.001, t-statistic=-0.720) and Execomp2 (for Small 23 
 
Firms;  coefficient=0.016,  t-statistic=2.110,  for  Large  Firms;  coefficient=-0.003,  t-statistic=-
0.420).  These indicate that the increase in executive compensation brought about by the Act is 
primarily confined to relatively smaller non-profits. Further, we are able to comfortably reject 
the null hypothesis that the interaction coefficient is the same for both large non-profits and 
small non-profits (F-statistic=6.10 for Execomp1 and F-statistic=3.16 for Execomp2). To the 
extent  that  the  findings  of  prior  literature  that  size  is  a  reasonable  proxy  for  the  voluntary 
adoption of more stringent governance measures applies to our setting, these results highlight 
that the costs of regulation (in terms of executive compensation) has differed on the likelihood of 
such voluntary adoptions.  These results also add further confidence to our assertion that changes 
observed in Hypothesis 1 are in fact a result of the Act. 
Insert Table 7 here 
We next verify our results above by using the California control group. Table 8 reports 
these results. The Table shows that the interaction coefficient     ̂    which captures the effect of 
the  Act  on  the  executive  compensation  in  affected  California  non-profits  is  positive  and 
significant  for  both  Execomp1  (coefficient=0.003,  t-statistic=16.190)  and  Execomp2 
(coefficient=0.007,  t-statistic=13.650)  for  the  smaller  firms.  It  is  not  significant  for  either 
Execomp1 or Execomp2 for the larger firms. These results are consistent with the results in Table 
7 and suggest that the Act has appeared to have failed to reduce executive compensation in 
smaller non-profits. It did not seem to have a significant impact on the larger non-profits, which 
are more likely  to have already adopted stringent SOX-like governance mechanisms voluntarily. 
Insert Table 8 here 
We  now  explore  some  alternative  explanations  for  observing  greater  increases  in 
compensation costs for affected California non-profits. 24 
 
5.3 Possible alternative explanations for the observed increase in executive compensation in 
affected non-profits 
We interpreted our findings in tests of H1 as evidence of the Act increasing executive 
compensation  expenses,  in  contrast  to  its  intentions.    However,  it  could  be  argued  that  the 
observed increase in reported executive compensation costs cannot be viewed in a negative light 
if it is due to one of the following reasons. 
1.  Increases in compensation were accompanied by overall reductions in non-program 
expenses (i.e. even though executive compensation has increased, the Act may have 
lead to greater savings in other non-program expenses). 
2.  Increases in compensation were accompanied by greater efforts towards charitable 
activities, as measured by a higher program ratio. 
3.  The observed increase in reported executive compensation cost  is  due to  reduced 
managerial  discretion  in  classification  shifting  of  costs  (Jones  and  Roberts  2006; 
Krishnan, et. al 2006) as a result of the better reporting discipline brought about by 
the Act (i.e. elimination of classification shifting in post-Act periods have created the 
“appearance” of higher executive compensation costs). 
If any of the above are true, then higher executive compensation in post-Act periods 
cannot  be  viewed  as  evidence  of  regulation  not  meeting  its  intended  objectives.  Indeed,  if 
explanations 1 and 2 above hold true, we should expect any post-Act increases in executive 
compensation to  be accompanied by improvements  in  operating performance.   For instance, 
measures such as non-program expenses to total revenue (Non-program expense ratio) should go 
down and ratio of program expenses to total expenses (Program ratio) should go up.  In the 25 
 
absence of such changes, the two above-mentioned justifications of the increased compensation 
will not be valid. 
The  third  alternative  explanation  of  elimination  of  opportunistic  cost-shifting  would 
result in stopping the shifting of reported costs across categories (that is, from administration 
expenses  to  program  expenses),  without  altering  the  total  cost  structure.    Hence,  if  this 
explanation  holds,  one should  not  observe  a  relative  change  (i.e.  deterioration)  in  excess  of 
revenue over expenses scaled by revenue (Excess) in post-Act periods.  On the other hand, if 
Excess deteriorates in the post-Act period in comparison to control group, it becomes more likely 
that  higher  reported  executive  compensation  cannot  be  attributed  to  reduced  cost  shifting 
activities and is probably caused by a true increase in executive compensation costs.   
We explore these alternative explanations through the following  Research Propositions.  
RP1: Affected California not-for-profits have experienced a greater reduction in 
the ratio of non-program expenses to total revenue from to pre to post-Act periods 
when compared with the control group. 
RP2: Affected California not-for-profits have experienced a greater increase in 
Program ratio from to pre to post-Act periods when compared with the control 
group. 
RP3: The excess of revenue over expenses (Excess) of Affected California not-for-
profits  has  improved  from  pre  to  post-Act  periods  when  compared  with  the 
control group. 
If we find the results consistent with these research propositions, it becomes possible that 
our earlier findings for H1 are not indicative of the Act being burdensome on the affected non-
profits.  On the other hand, if these propositions are not to be empirically supported, then we can 26 
 
effectively rule out the alternative explanations outlined above and can be more confident that 
any  observed  increases  in  executive  compensation  expenses  are  in  fact  due  to  greater 
compensation costs associated with higher risk exposure and administrative burden.  
Table 9 presents results for the tests of RP1-3 for our main sample. Panel A reports 
univariate results. As indicated in Table 9, we do not find any evidence of California not-for-
profits improving either the Non-program expense Ratio or Program Ratio in post Act periods in 
comparison to sample group (Research Propositions 1 and 2).  As a matter of fact, California 
non-profits indicate a relative deterioration of both measures (the deterioration in Non-program 
expense Ratio is statistically significant, whereas that in Program Ratio is not) from pre to post-
Act periods.
12  These results tend to indicate that observed increases in executive compensation 
are unlikely to be off-set by savings or improvements in operating efficiency elsewhere.   
If, as argued in  the  alternative explanation  (3)  above  that the  observed increases  in 
executive compensation are due to reduced classification shifting activities , then we should not 
observe any pre to post-Act changes (i.e. decreases) in excess of revenue over expenses (Excess) 
for California non-profits in comparison to those of Ohio (Research Proposition 3).  However, 
Panel A of Table 9 shows that California non-profits have in fact witnessed a relative decrease in 
Excess from pre to post Act periods when compared with the change in Ohio (t-statistic=-6.494, 
p-value<0.01).    Hence,  it  is  unlikely  that  observed  increases  in  executive  compensation  are 
driven by improvements in reporting quality brought about by the Act.  Indeed, the observed 
increases in executive compensation expenses appear to be real. 
Insert Table 9 here 
                                                           
12The z-statistic and p-value for difference-of-differences in Non-program expense Ratio are 7.350 and <0.001 respectively.  z-
statistic and p-value for difference-of-differences in Program Ratio are -1.325 and 0.185 respectively.   27 
 
Panel B of Table 9 reports results of multivariate tests for Research Propositions 1-3 
where industry effects are controlled for.  These results are very similar those of the univariate 
tests. Specifically, the interaction coefficient (   ̂) which captures the effect of the Act on the 
executive compensation in affected California non-profits, is positive and statistically significant 
for Non-program expense Ratio (coefficient=0.025 t-statistic=1.740), statistically insignificant 
for  Program  Ratio  (coefficient=0.002  t-statistic=1.050),  and  negative  and  significant 
(coefficient= -2.157, t-statistic=-2.920) for Excess, suggesting that while there is no evidence of 
a decrease in administrative costs or an increase in program-related expenses, the Act appears to 
have reduced the excess of income over expenses in affected non-profits. 
We next replicate the above results with the California control group. Table 10 presents 
these results. Panel A of Table 10 presents the univariate results. Consistent with Table 9, Panel 
A shows that the difference-in-differences in the Non-program expense Ratio is positive and 
significant (difference-in-differences=0.004, z-statistic=1.629), while that in the Program Ratio 
is statistically insignificant for the affected California non-profits. The difference-in-differences 
for the Excess of the affected organizations is, negative and statistically significant (difference-
in-differences= -0.003, z-statistic=-2.723). The multivariate results in Panel B show that, the 
interaction coefficient     ̂ , which captures the effect of the Act on the executive compensation 
in affected California non-profits, is not statistically significant for the Non-program expense 
Ratio and Program Ratio, but negative and statistically significant for Excess (coefficient= -
0.017,  t-statistic=-2.920),  suggesting  that  while  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  decrease  in 
administrative costs or a relative increase in program-related expenses, the Act appears to have 
reduced the excess of income over expenses of affected non-profits. 
Insert Table 10 here 28 
 
  Collectively, these results indicate that the Act has resulted in an increase in executive 
compensation costs and the increase is very much likely due to greater risk and administrative 
burden imposed on non-profit executives by the Act.  This raises concerns over the efficacy of 
the  Act  in  relation  to  its  provisions  aimed  at  curbing  compensations  that  were  supposedly 
“excessive”.   
The next section concludes. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper we assess whether and how California’s Non-profit Integrity Act (2004) 
impacted  the  executive  compensation  costs  of  affected  charitable  organizations.    Given  the 
general concerns aired by regulators over the potentially excessive executive compensation in 
non-profits  and  the  specific  requirement  of  the  Act  aimed  at  ensuring  that  executive 
compensations are “just and reasonable” it is clear that regulators had expected the Act to have 
a moderating effect on executive compensation.  Our findings, however, indicate that the Act has 
resulted  in  an  increase  in  executive  compensation  costs  for  affected  California  non-profits.  
Further analyses  also  reveal  that these increases  are primarily  confined to  relatively  smaller 
organizations  within  the  affected  non-profits  where  there  was  a  low  likelihood  of  pre-Act 
voluntary adoption of governance measures.  These results are robust to the use of either similar 
non-profits domiciled in the State of Ohio, or California non-profits from exempt industries as 
the control group. 
As the apparent compensation increases could also be explained by overall declines in 
non-program  costs,  greater  efforts  towards  charitable  activities,  and/or  elimination  of 
opportunistic cost shifting activities, we also check the impact of the Act on non-program costs, 29 
 
program ratio and the excess of income over expenses. These additional tests indicate that the 
observed  increases  in  executive  compensation  costs  are  not  due  to  above  alternative 
explanations. 
When  combined  with  Neely’s  (2011)  failure  to  find  that  the  Act  has  resulted  in 
improvements  in  reporting  quality  or  commercial  fund  raising  activities,  our  findings  raise 
concerns with  respect to  the efficacy of the Act.   We believe our findings  to  have broader 
implications  for  informing  policy  debate  on  the  relative  merits  of  regulating  non-profits 
governance  as  a  number  of  other  states  have  either  adopted  similar  regulations  or  are 
contemplating to do so (Mead 2008).  Moreover, our findings are also consistent with some 
concerns raised in the corporate sector that attempts to regulate executive compensation can lead 
to unintended consequences (Cohen et al 2008b, Romano 2005). 
However, we would like to add the following caveats to our results.  First, our findings – 
even  when  interpreted  in  conjunction  with  Neely  (2011)  –  should  not  be  interpreted  as  a 
comprehensive repudiation of the efficacy of the Act.  Our study (as well as Neely, 2011) is 
focused on a specific facet that we believe to be of interest to researchers as well as practitioners 
and policy makers.  However, in our opinion, the extant body of literature is not sufficient to 
make broad claims on the overall efficacy of the Act.  Second, while our findings can have 
general implications for the debate on governance regulation in both not-for-profit and corporate 
sectors,  we  caution  against  over  generalizations  of  these  as  specific  institutional  and 
environmental  settings  can  either  moderate  or  intensify  these  effects.    We  leave  further 
investigation of these aspects to future researchers. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
   Full Sample  California  Ohio 
Details  Firms  Observations  Firms  Observations  Firms  Observations 
              Initial sample of 501 (c) 
(3)
a organizations   57,352  201,661  42,473  147,268  14,879  54,393 
Less: 
            Gross receipts less than 
USD 2mn
b  50,347  175,625  37,427  128,610  12,920  47,015 
Industries that are exempt 
or could not be 
identified
c,
d  2,909  11,422  2,003  7,852  906  3,570 
Missing values for key 
variables  2,493  5,479  1,850  4,002
e  643  1,477 
Outliers  49  621  38  475
f  11  146 
Final Sample  1,554  8,514  1,155  6,329
g  399  2,185 
 
                                                           
a  The IRS code section 501 (c) (3) provides for an exemption from federal income tax and allows donors to these 
organizations to deduct their donation on their federal income tax return. To qualify for 501 (c) (3) exemption, an 
organization  must  be  organized  to  operate  exclusively  for  one  or  more  of  the  following  purposes:  charitable, 
religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering national or international amateur sports 
competition, and/or the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. 
 The initial sample is based on all 501 (c) (3) organizations that report to the Attorney General’s office in California 
and Ohio respectively. The sample is based on all organizations for which there are data on the NCCS digitized 
database (1998-2003), the NCCS Core database (2002-2007) and individual Form 990s. Data from individual form 
990s are necessary for defining gross receipts (see b, below). The sample covers the 6 year period from 2002 to 
2007.  
b Government grants and contract income are removed from the calculation of gross receipts. 
c The Act does not apply to organizations that are classified as religious, grant making, health or education 
d We use a second control group of firms from California that belong to the exempt sectors defined in footnote c. For 
this control group, we also include these observations. Our second sample (the California sample) thus consists of 
observations drawn only from California. We do not include the Ohio firms in this sample. 
e Observations with missing values for the California sample: 6,443. 
f Outliers for the California sample: 919 
g The final California sample: 11,296 observations (2,063 firms). 
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Table 2: Industry Distribution (Percentage) 
 
Industry
h 
Full 
Sample  California  Ohio 
        Arts, Culture, and Humanities  10.5  10.1  11.6 
Environmental Quality, Protection, and Beautification  1.7  1.9  1.2 
Animal-Related  1.2  1.6  0.0 
Diseases, Disorders, Medical Disciplines  3.1  3.0  3.3 
Mental Health, Crisis Intervention  9.4  9.1  10.3 
Crime, Legal Related  2.9  3.1  2.2 
Employment, Job related  5.5  5.4  5.7 
Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition  2.2  2.2  2.2 
Housing, Shelter  7.3  7.0  8.0 
Public Safety, Disaster Preparedness, and Relief  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Recreation, Sports, Leisure, Athletics  1.6  1.8  1.1 
Youth Development  3.9  4.4  2.5 
Human Services - Multipurpose and Other  42.0  41.7  43.0 
International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security  2.2  2.7  0.5 
Civil Rights, Social Action and Advocacy  0.5  0.7  0.0 
Community Improvement, Capacity Building  3.8  2.6  7.2 
Science and Technology, Research Institutes, Services  1.1  1.3  0.5 
Social Science Research Institutes, Services  0.3  0.4  0.0 
Public Society Benefit - Multipurpose and Other  0.7  0.8  0.6 
  100.0  100.0  100.0 
                                                           
h  The National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) Core Codes divides the universe of non-profit organizations into 26 major 
groups.  The  Table  above  classifies  the  sample  of  8,514  firm-year  observations  defined  in  Table  1,  based  on  this  NTEE 
classification. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
i 
   Full Sample  California  Ohio 
Variable  Mean  Median  S. D.  Mean  Median  S. D.  Mean   Median  S. D. 
Total Assets  23.160  6.102  63.886  22.644  5.846  66.467  24.657  6.909  55.727 
Total Revenue  12.836  6.099  22.130  13.638  6.163  24.152  10.513  5.907  14.544 
Total Expenses  11.963  5.654  20.908  12.774  5.717  22.905  9.614  5.408  13.283 
Program Expenses  9.690  4.637  5.293  10.474  4.688  6.101  7.403  4.435  9.453 
Non-program Expenses  2.210  1.020  8.903  2.209  1.029  8.766  2.211  0.964  9.068 
Total Salaries  1.436  0.226  5.601  1.533  0.229  5.766  1.442  0.216  5.097 
Officer Salaries  0.803  0.516  0.985  0.785  0.518  0.949  0.864  0.486  1.102 
Execomp1  0.032  0.022  0.048  0.032  0.022  0.045  0.032  0.022  0.055 
Execomp2  0.117  0.065  0.166  0.116  0.064  0.162  0.124  0.067  0.178 
Program ratio  0.785  0.812  0.112  0.814  0.810  0.113  0.783  0.825  0.110 
Non-program expense 
ratio 
0.169  0.161  1.392  0.162  0.167  1.217  0.210  0.163  1.179 
Excess  0.041  0.018  0.239  0.042  0.017  0.171  0.044  0.017  0.289 
 
                                                           
i  The sample is based on the sample of 8,514 observations (6,329 in California and 2,185 in Ohio) for the period 2002-2007, defined in Table 1. The variables are defined as 
follows: Total Assets =  Total assets at the end of the year, line 59 on Form 990; Total Revenue = Total revenue, line item 12 on Form 990; Total Expenses = Total revenue, line 
item 17 on Form 990; Program Expenses = Total program-related expenses; Non-Program Expenses = Difference between total expenses and program-related expenses; Total 
Salaries = The total compensation expenses reported on Form 990; Officer Salaries = Total compensation paid to the top 5 executives, as reported on Form 990; Execomp1 = 
The ratio of the total compensation paid to executives to the total revenue earned in the period; Execomp2 = The ratio of the total compensation paid to executives to the total 
compensation paid during the year; Program Ratio = The ratio of program related expenses to total expenses; Non-program expense ratio = The ratio of non-program expenses 
to total revenue; Excess = Excess of income over expenses defined as the ratio of gross operating and non-operating income to gross revenue. 
All figures, other than the ratios have been expressed in $ mn. 
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Table 4: Analysis of Executive Compensation 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
      California  Ohio 
Execomp1     
  Pre-Act     
    Mean  0.030  0.032 
    Median  0.021  0.021 
  Post-Act     
    Mean  0.034  0.033 
    Median  0.024  0.023 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   0.004*** 
(6.050) 
0.001*** 
(2.369) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
0.003*** 
                (5.439) 
         
Execomp2     
  Pre-Act       
    Mean  0.105  0.121 
    Median  0.059  0.061 
  Post-Act       
    Mean  0.125  0.127 
    Median  0.070  0.073 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   0.020*** 
(6.697) 
0.006*** 
(3.366) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
0.014*** 
                 (5.523) 
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Panel B: Multivariate Analysis
j 
Model: 
                                                                        
 
 
  Execomp1  Execomp2 
 
    Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept     ̂  1.626***  2.740  23.708**  2.580 
Post
k     ̂  -0.015  -0.070  0.576  0.800 
Calif
l     ̂  -0.368*  -1.740  -1.462***  -2.440 
Post*Calif     ̂  0.423*  1.640  1.382*  1.690 
           
Industry Controls?    Yes    Yes   
Adj. R
2    2.49%    12.53%   
N    8,511    8,283   
 
                                                           
j ***,**, and * represent statistical significances at the 1%, 5% level or better and 10% level respectively. 
The Table above reports tests based on the sample of 8,514 observations (6,329 in California and 2,185 in Ohio) for the period 
2002-2007 (pre-Act: 2002-2004, post-Act: 2005-2007), defined in Table 1. Panel A above presents the univariate Wilcoxon 
signed rank test results for the equality of the dependent variables.  Panel B presents results for the multivariate regressions 
(heteroscedasticity adjusted). 
k Post: A dummy variable that takes of value 1 for year on or after 2004; zero otherwise. 
l Calif: A dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the observation is from California; zero otherwise. 38 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the California control group 
California
m 
Variable  Mean  Median  S.D. 
Total Assets  37.866  8.503  105.216 
Total Revenue  24.900  7.699  50.231 
Total Expenses  19.307  6.279  46.624 
Program Expenses  16.790  5.086  5.239 
Non-program Expenses  2.852  1.193  5.174 
Total Salaries  2.425  0.890  14.171 
Officer Compensation  0.360  0.178  1.442 
Execomp1  0.030  0.019  0.050 
Execomp2  0.094  0.048  0.165 
Program ratio  0.822  0.802  0.046 
Non-program expense Ratio  0.114  0.155  0.129 
Excess  0.044  0.030  0.196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
m The Table above is based on a sample of 4,967 observations for the period of 2002 to 2007.  The sample above is 
drawn  from  non-profit  organizations  in  California  that  have  gross  receipts  (excluding  Government  grants  and 
contract income) of more than $2mn and classified as religious, grant making, health or education. 
The variables are defined as follows: Total Assets =  Total assets at the end of the year, line 59 on Form 990; Total 
Revenue = Total revenue, line item 12 on Form 990; Total Expenses = Total revenue, line item 17 on Form 990; 
Program  Expenses  =  Total  program-related  expenses;  Non-Program  Expenses  =  Difference  between  total 
expenses and program-related expenses; Total Salaries = The total compensation expenses reported on Form 990; 
Officer Salaries = Total compensation paid to the top 5 executives, as reported on Form 990; Execomp1 = The 
ratio of the total compensation paid to executives to the total revenue earned in the period; Execomp2 = The ratio of 
the total compensation paid to executives to the total compensation paid during the year; Program Ratio = The ratio 
of program related expenses to total expenses; Non-program expense ratio = The ratio of non-program expenses to 
total revenue; Excess = Excess of income over expenses defined as the ratio of gross operating and non-operating 
income to gross revenue. 
All figures, other than the ratios, have been expressed in $ mn.   
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Table 6: Analysis of Executive Compensation for the California control group 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
      California 
(Treatment) 
California 
(Exempt) 
Execomp1     
  Pre-Act     
    Mean  0.030  0.031 
    Median  0.021  0.017 
  Post-Act     
    Mean  0.033  0.033 
    Median  0.024  0.020 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   0.003*** 
(5.439) 
0.002*** 
(3.429) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
0.002*** 
                (7.418) 
         
Execomp2     
  Pre-Act       
    Mean  0.098  0.096 
    Median  0.054  0.043 
  Post-Act       
    Mean  0.123  0.100 
    Median  0.067  0.051 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   0.025*** 
(5.997) 
0.004*** 
(3.675) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
0.022*** 
                 (10.616) 
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Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
Model: 
                                                                    
 
 
  Execomp1  Execomp2 
 
    Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept     ̂  0.029***
n  28.160  0.097***  26.450 
Post
o     ̂  0.000  0.470  0.001  0.180 
Test
p     ̂  -0.016***  -2.960  0.125  1.360 
Post*Test     ̂  0.003*  1.900  0.018***  2.960 
           
Industry Controls?    Yes    Yes   
Adj. R
2    1.28%    7.19%   
N    11,296    11,296   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
n***,**, and * represent statistical significances at the 1%, 5% level or better and 10% level respectively. 
The Table above reports tests based on the sample of 11,296 observations (6,329 in California treatment group and 
4,967 in California exempt group) for the period 2002-2007 (pre-Act: 2002-2004, post-Act: 2005-2007). Panel A 
above presents the univariate Wilcoxon signed rank test results for the equality of the dependent variables.  Panel B 
presents results for the multivariate regressions (heteroscedasticity adjusted). 
  
o Post: A dummy variable that takes of value 1 for year on or after 2004, zero otherwise. 
pTest: A dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the organization is not classified as religious, grant making, health or 
education; zero otherwise. 41 
 
Table 7: Analysis of Executive Compensation – Small vs. Large Firms 
Model: 
                                                                        
 
 
 
  Execomp1  Execomp2 
    Small Firms  Large Firms  Small Firms  Large Firms 
 
    Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept
q     ̂  0.000  0.020  0.000  1.070  0.000  0.020  0.002  1.300 
Post     ̂  0.001  0.730  0.005***  3.880  0.003  0.490  0.025***  3.790 
Calif     ̂  -0.006***  -3.200  0.005***  3.880  -0.008  -1.630  -0.002  -0.420 
Post*Calif     ̂  0.007***  2.430  -0.001  -0.720  0.016**  2.110  -0.003  -0.420 
                   
Industry 
Controls? 
  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj. R
2    23.08%  30.26% 
F - Statistic    6.10  3.16 
N    8,511  8,283 
 
                                                           
q  The regression results above are based on the sample of 501 (c) (3) organizations defined in Table 1. The sample covers the 6 year period from 2002 to 2007 and consists of 
8,514 observations. The variables are as defined in Tables 2, 3 and 5. 
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Table 8: Analysis of Executive Compensation – Small vs. Large Firms for the California sample 
Model: 
                                                                    
 
 
 
  Execomp1  Execomp2 
    Small Firms  Large Firms  Small Firms  Large Firms 
 
    Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept     ̂  0.005***
r  9.500  0.003***   9.110  0.014***    9.450  0.010    7.710 
Post     ̂  0.034***  28.860  0.020***  29.820  0.091***  25.600  0.073  26.250 
Test     ̂  0.009  0.460  0.040***    8.440  0.061    1.050  0.202  10.520 
Post*Test     ̂  0.003***  16.190  -0.002  - 0.640  0.007***  13.650  -0.005  -1.320 
                   
Industry 
Controls? 
  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj. R
2    15.64%  19.49% 
F - Statistic    36.89  9.18 
N    11,296  11,296 
                                                           
r  ***,**,  and  *  represent  statistical  significances at  the1%,  5%  level  or  better  and  10%  level  respectively.  The  t-statistics  reported in  the  Table have  been  adjusted  for 
heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 9: Analysis of Non-program expense Ratio, Program Ratio, and Excess of income 
over expenses 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
      California  Ohio 
Non-program expense Ratio     
  Pre-Act     
    Mean  0.153  0.208 
    Median  0.164  0.161 
  Post-Act     
    Mean  0.169  0.212 
    Median  0.175  0.164 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   0.016*** 
(3.034) 
0.004 
(1.459) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
                 0.012*** 
                (7.350) 
         
Program Ratio     
  Pre-Act       
    Mean  0.822  0.742 
    Median  0.813  0.822 
  Post-Act       
    Mean  0.810  0.790 
    Median  0.807  0.846 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   -0.012 
(0.679) 
0.048 
(0.976) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
                 -0.060 
                (-1.325) 
         
Excess     
  Pre-Act       
    Mean  0.034  0.023 
    Median  0.014  0.013 
  Post-Act       
    Mean  0.059  0.070 
    Median  0.026  0.027 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   0.025*** 
(6.873) 
0.047*** 
(4.903) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
-0.022*** 
                (-6.494) 44 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
Model: 
                                                                        
 
 
 
  Non-program expense 
Ratio  Program Ratio  Excess 
 
    Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept
s     ̂  0.719***  2.890  0.012  0.970  15.897***  3.930 
Post     ̂  -0.051***  -0.140  0.002  1.160  4.669***  3.580 
Calif     ̂  -0.055***  -2.920  0.013***  5.640  1.478  1.180 
Post*Calif     ̂  0.025*  1.740  0.002  1.050  -2.157***  -2.920 
               
Industry 
Controls? 
  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj. R
2    6.37%    15.36%    2.42%   
N    8,514    8,514    8,511   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
sThe tests are based on the sample of 501 (c) (3) organizations defined in Table 1. The sample covers the 6 year 
period from 2002 to 2007 and consists of 8,514 observations (6,329 for California and 2,185 for Ohio). In the Table 
above, “Before” (“After”) refers to the years before (after) 2004. Variables are defined as in the Table 4. 
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Table 10: Analysis of Non-program expense Ratio, Program Ratio, and Excess of income 
over expenses for California control group 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
      California 
(Treatment) 
California 
(Control) 
Non-program Expense Ratio     
  Pre-Act     
    Mean  0.153  0.109 
    Median  0.164  0.152 
  Post-Act     
    Mean  0.169  0.121 
    Median  0.175  0.157 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   0.016*** 
(3.034) 
0.012*** 
(2.859) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
                 0.004* 
                (1.629) 
         
Program Ratio     
  Pre-Act       
    Mean  0.821  0.814 
    Median  0.813  0.836 
  Post-Act       
    Mean  0.819  0.826 
    Median  0.807  0.838 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   -0.002 
(0.505) 
0.012 
(0.962) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
                 -0.015 
                (-0.525) 
         
Excess     
  Pre-Act       
    Mean  0.031  0.034 
    Median  0.013  0.025 
  Post-Act       
    Mean  0.052  0.058 
    Median  0.023  0.036 
         
  Pre to Post Difference   0.021*** 
(4.621) 
0.024*** 
(3.313) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences  
 
-0.003*** 
                (-2.723) 
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Panel B: Multivariate Analysis
t 
Model: 
                                                                      
 
 
 
  
                                                           
t The tests are based on the sample of 501 (c) (3) organizations defined in Table 1. The sample covers the 6 year 
period from 2002 to 2007 and consists of 11,296 observations (6,329 in California treatment group and 4,967 in 
California  exempt  group)  for  the  period  2002-2007  (pre-Act:  2002-2004,  post-Act:  2005-2007)..  Variables  are 
defined as in the Tables 4 and 6. 
 
 
 
  Non-program expense 
Ratio 
Program Ratio  Excess 
    Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept     ̂  0.935***  187.85  0.019***  18.830  0.039***  3.930 
Post     ̂  -0.026***  -3.960  0.003***  2.640  0.022***  3.580 
Test     ̂  -0.096***  -2.470  0.025  1.220  0.135***  1.180 
Post*Test     ̂  0.000  0.040  -0.003  -1.210  -0.017**  -2.920 
Industry 
Controls? 
  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj. R
2    3.55%    12.84%    1.37%   
N    10,974    10,974    11,296   